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I. INTRODUCTION
Maybe you’ve heard, the United States Supreme Court has been on
a bit of a pro-arbitration tear recently, upholding ever-more draconian
dispute resolution clauses inserted in standard-form contracts against all
sorts of legal and policy-based challenges. The most recent cases to
arrive at the Court have involved class action bans embedded within
arbitration clauses, which require the parties to surrender the right to
bring a class or representative claim in either the arbitral or judicial fora.
In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, a divided Court held that the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempted the categorical use of state uncon-
scionability doctrine to strike down class action bans in consumer adhe-
sion contracts.1 More recently, in American Express v. Italian Colors,
the same five Justices again ruled that class action bans are broadly
enforceable—even where proving the violation of a federal statute in an
individual arbitration would be so costly that no rational claimant would
undertake it, allowing some federal statutory rights to simply go
unvindicated.2
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Many thanks to the University of
Miami Law Review for inviting me to present a draft of this paper at the Leading from Below
Symposium in honor of the great Judge Jack Weinstein, and special thanks to Judge Shira
Sheindlin for her words of wisdom and her courage of conviction. Also, thanks to Symposium
Editor McKillop Erlandson and the other panelists and presenters.
1. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
2. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (“[T]he fact that it
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With the decisions in Concepcion and Italian Colors, the battle
over class action bans in arbitration clauses appears to be over and cor-
porate defendants appear to have won decisive—total—victories. Not
surprisingly, scholars (myself included) have been gloomily forecasting
the end of class actions and aggregate litigation in the wake of these
decisions.3 Observers also predict that small-value individual claims are
unlikely to be arbitrated—and certainly not in sufficient numbers to mir-
ror the deterrent effects of a class action.4 Further, the individual claims
that are brought in arbitration will be straightforward and simple dis-
putes between the parties; “procedurally difficult” claims, to use Profes-
sor Jean Sternlight’s nomenclature, cannot realistically be brought by
individuals in arbitration.5 So, by merely adding an arbitration clause
(containing a class action ban and an anti-reform provision) to their con-
tracts, corporate entities have seemingly won the right to cheaply and
easily insulate themselves against many forms of privately-enforced
legal liability, and with this, the right to continue engaging in practices
that cause widespread harm, unless and until detected by a public
enforcer.
But, thus far, the Supreme Court’s rulings have only considered
whether class actions for monetary damages may be barred by arbitra-
tion clauses requiring individual adjudication.6 The Justices have not
is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”).
3. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake
of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 639–58 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight,
Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703,
704 (2012); Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Action After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L.
REV. 767, 767 (2012).
4. See, e.g., Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1258 (W.D. Wash. 2009)
(finding only an “infinitesimal” number AT&T customers had filed arbitration claims), rev’d on
other grounds, 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment
on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78,
110–11 (2011) (reporting that between 2003 and 2007, only 170 consumers out of nearly 54
million subscribers entered AT&T’s inexpensive arbitration procedure). But see Myriam Gilles &
Anthony Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL
L. REV. 447, 468–83 (2014) (describing possible ways of bringing mass, serial arbitrations).
5. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from
Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 89 (2012).
6. Recall that Concepcion and Italian Colors were damages class actions under Rule
23(b)(3): in neither case did plaintiffs assert that their rights could only be vindicated if the
defendant’s policies or practices were changed or if some other form of equitable relief were
granted. See First Amended Complaint at 3–4, In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., No. 1:03-cv-
09592 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2009) (“Plaintiffs bring this action . . . as a damages class action under
Rule 23(b)(3).”); Class Action Complaint For: (1) Violation of California Code of Regulations,
Section 1585(b)(6); and (2) Violation of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200
et. seq. at 14, Laster v. T-Mobile, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 05-cv-1167-JM)
(plaintiff’s prayer for relief included “damages in an amount to be proven at trial”).
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examined the enforceability of arbitration clauses or arbitral rules, which
explicitly prohibit claimants from seeking or arbitrators from granting
broad injunctive relief in an individual dispute. For example, if an indi-
vidual small business owner sought to arbitrate its Clayton Act claim
against American Express (“Amex”)—its only available option in the
wake of Italian Colors—could an arbitrator award injunctive relief in
the form of striking down the anti-competitive rules in the merchant’s
contract with Amex? Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act authorizes
precisely this sort of equitable remedy,7 and the Supreme Court has long
recognized the importance of equitable remedies in the enforcement of
antitrust laws.8 Yet, the Amex arbitration clause explicitly provides that
“[t]he Arbitrator shall have no power or authority to alter the Agreement
or any of its separate provisions.”9
Alternatively, could our intrepid small merchant in an individual
arbitration seek a broad injunction against future enforcement of Amex’s
anticompetitive rules as against itself and all market participants? After
all, equitable remedies available under the antitrust laws are generally
intended to be forward-looking and market-wide—i.e., to generate price
competition between and amongst business rivals going forward.10 Indi-
vidualized injunctions rarely solve the problem of widespread antitrust
injury. But here, again, Amex’s arbitration clause expressly bans broad
injunctions “on behalf of” or “award[ed] to” merchants beyond the
named claimant.11
Taken together, these prohibitions and limitations on relief—what I
7. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2012) (entitling “[a]ny person . . . to sue for and have injunctive relief . . .
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . .”). See also California v.
Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 294 (1990) (“[A] fair reading of the entire legislative history
supports the conclusion that § 16 . . . should be construed generously and flexibly pursuant to
principles of equity.”).
8. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 133 (1969) (recognizing
that a critical end to be served in equitable suits under the Clayton Act is that “‘they effectively
pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants’ illegal restraints’”) (quoting
Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947)).
9. AMERICAN EXPRESS CARD ACCEPTANCE AGREEMENT § 7.d.vi (2012) [hereinafter CAA],
available at http://www.evopayments.com/uploads/other/OnePoint_April2014wRates.pdf; see
also id. § 7.d.iv (“The arbitrator’s authority to resolve Claims is limited to Claims between you
and us alone, and the arbitrator’s authority to make awards is limited to awards to you and us
alone.”).
10. Courts have routinely recognized that market-wide antitrust injunctions are appropriate,
even in non-class cases, provided that the broad relief is necessary to redress antitrust injury. See
infra text accompanying notes 64–70 (discussing Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 371 (7th
Cir. 1990), Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1226 (9th Cir. 1997),
and other cases).
11. CAA, supra note 9, § 7.d.iv; see also id. (there is no right to arbitrate “ON BEHALF OF
THE GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER PARTIES”); id. § 7.d.iii (“YOU SHALL NOT HAVE
THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY . . . PERTAINING TO
ANY CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION.”).
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term “anti-reform” provisions—prohibit an individual arbitral claimant
from seeking to end a practice, change a rule, or enjoin an act that causes
injury to itself and to similarly-situated non-parties. And these sorts of
provisions are now cropping up in the standard-form arbitration clauses
of many major companies, including cellphone service providers and
other consumer-oriented enterprises.12 Yet, to date, neither the Supreme
Court’s FAA decisions nor opinions by the lower federal courts have
squarely addressed the question of whether such provisions are
enforceable.13
Predictably, corporate drafters assert that these sorts of provisions
are fully enforceable under the FAA and relevant case law. They argue
that atomized, individual injunctions against unlawful conduct remain
within the arbitrator’s authority to grant, and that the “no modification”
language merely denies the arbitrator the ability to rewrite the underly-
ing agreement.14 These legal arguments are serious and the stakes are
high: if a single claimant could enjoin widespread injurious practices in
arbitration, these defendants will have lost the advantages afforded them
by the Court’s FAA jurisprudence, which effectively immunizes viola-
12. See, e.g., Schatz v. Cellco P’ship, 842 F. Supp. 2d 594, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing
Verizon Customer Agreement, § 3, which provides that “[t]he arbitrator may award money or
injunctive relief only in favor of the individual party and only to the extent necessary to provide
relief warranted by that party’s individual claim”); Riensche v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 2:06-
cv-01325, 2013 WL 951012, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 12, 2013) (stating that Cingular’s clause
says “[t]he arbitrator may award injunctive relief only in favor of the individual party seeking
relief and only to the extent necessary to provide relief warranted by the party’s individual
claim”); AT&T, WIRELESS CUSTOMER AGREEMENT § 2.2(6), available at http://www.att.com/le
gal/terms.wirelessCustomerAgreement.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (“The arbitrator may
award declaratory or injunctive relief only in favor of the individual party seeking relief and only
to the extent necessary to provide relief warranted by that party’s individual claim. YOU AND
AT&T AGREE THAT EACH MAY BRING CLAIMS AGAINST THE OTHER ONLY IN
YOUR OR ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND NOT AS A PLAINTIFF OR CLASS
MEMBER IN ANY PURPORTED CLASS OR REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDING.”). Other
companies are beginning to insert anti-reform language into arbitration clauses found in
employment agreements. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-02122,
2013 WL 3233211, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013) (“arbitration agreement [with employee] only
extends to claims ‘that the Company may have against [plaintiff] or that [plaintiff] may have
against [the Company]’”).
13. The Court did make passing reference to anti-reform clauses in Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991) (rejecting employee’s argument that age
discrimination claim is not arbitrable: “arbitration procedures cannot adequately further the
purposes of [age discrimination law] because they [prohibit] broad equitable relief and class
actions”); see also In re Apple & AT&T Mobility Antitrust Litig., 826 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1175
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that arbitration clause is void because arbitration
“forecloses [their] public injunction remedy”).
14. See, e.g., Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss the Proceedings in Favor of Arbitration, or Alternatively, Dismiss Count III and Compel
the Remaining Claims to Arbitration at 2, In re Am. Express Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litig.,
11-md-02221 (NGG) (RER) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Reply Memorandum in
Support of Defendants].
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tive actions from legal review. Moreover, defense-side advocates are
deeply discomfited by the idea of arbitrators wielding unchecked author-
ity to issue broad and diverse injunctions in individual arbitrations,
given the limited rights of appeal to the courts.15 As such, questions
surrounding the enforceability of anti-reform clauses are just as impor-
tant to putative defendants as the class action bans they have spent years
defending; depending on the context, divesting individual claimants of
the power to enjoin or reform a market-wide policy or practice may be
even more critical than the threat of monetary liabilities.
Take an extreme but illustrative case: in 2011, three law firms
sought to challenge the proposed merger between AT&T Mobility and
T-Mobile, alleging it violated the Clayton Act.16 The firms filed more
than 2,000 demands for arbitration on behalf of individual AT&T sub-
scribers, each seeking injunctive relief in the form of blocking the
merger.17 If even one of these arbitrations had succeeded, the many,
many millions of dollars that AT&T and T-Mobile had invested in this
proposed deal would have been undone by just a single subscriber. Not
surprisingly, AT&T reacted swiftly and successfully enjoined the arbi-
trations on the grounds that the injunctive demand exceeded the scope of
the subscriber agreement.18
This essay is the first to consider the enforceability of anti-reform
provisions that are beginning to appear in contemporary arbitration
clauses in the wake of the Court’s major pro-arbitration decisions in
Concepcion and Italian Colors. I believe, and this essay will seek to
15. See, e.g., Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Our
review of the arbitrator’s award itself, however, is very deferential. We must sustain an arbitration
award even if we disagree with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the underlying contract as long as
the arbitrator’s decision ‘draws its essence’ from the contract. In other words, we must affirm the
arbitrator’s decision if it is rationally inferable from the letter or the purpose of the underlying
agreement. In deciding whether the arbitrator exceeded its authority, we resolve all doubts in favor
of arbitration.”) (citations omitted).
16. In June 2011, AT&T announced a $39 billion takeover of T-Mobile that was immediately
controversial. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”), and various state regulators objected to the merger, and in August 2011, the DOJ filed
suit alleging the proposed merger violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. See Complaint at 4,
United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01560 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011).
17. See Scott A. Bursor, Victory!, http://www.fightthemerger.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
18. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Fisher, No. DKC 11-2245, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
124839, at *15–16 (D. Md. Oct. 28, 2011) (holding under same clause that claim to block merger
cannot proceed in arbitration, and cautioning that AT&T Mobility’s interpretation that “customers
also waived any right to bring this type of action anywhere, including in court,” may well “violate
public policy and be unenforceable”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Gonnello, No. 1:11-cv-05636,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116420, at *11–12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011) (stating that consumer’s
individual claim seeking to block merger was outside scope of arbitration agreement where the
arbitration clause specifically “withheld from the arbitrator the power to decide questions that
would necessarily affect the rights of more than the parties to the dispute through the grant of
declaratory or injunctive relief”).
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show, that these provisions should be held unenforceable, as they render
arbitration a farcical and toothless imitation of adjudication.
Part II considers the argument made by corporate drafters that indi-
vidualized injunctions can serve as an adequate remedy for a claimant’s
injury. Claimants seeking broad equitable relief in non-class cases have
traditionally been put to the test of proving the “necessity” of the
requested relief as remedying their specific harm. This is a highly fact-
specific, context-dependent claim: in some cases, an individual, nar-
rowly-tailored injunction will be all that is necessary to remedy a claim-
ant’s injury, while in others, broader relief may be required.19 It is
therefore impossible to determine ex ante at the time of contracting
whether a claimant may subsequently suffer injury entitling her to broad
injunctive relief. As such, across-the-board, contractual prohibitions on
non-individualized injunctions are unenforceable, as these constitute “a
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.”20
Part III considers the corporate claim that no-modification
clauses—which prohibit an arbitrator from changing, modifying, or
altering provisions of the underlying agreement—are valid and enforce-
able. Advocates of no-modification clauses are careful to explain that
no-modification clauses do not severely impinge an arbitrator’s authority
to adjudicate a claim but merely prevent the arbitrator from rewriting
substantive terms in the underlying contract. Again, however, where a
claimant can prove an entitlement to equitable relief in the form of strik-
ing a contractual term or changing an underlying rule, denying the arbi-
trator authority to grant such relief hinders the claimant’s ability to
vindicate her statutory rights. As such, no-modification clauses are
exculpation clauses in sheep’s clothing, permitting defendants to ward
off liability by precluding claimants from seeking appropriate relief for
their injuries.
In conclusion, this essay directs our collective attention to the seri-
ous policy implications of enforcing anti-reform provisions in arbitration
clauses. As the war over arbitration moves into the injunctive arena,
judges and arbitrators will be asked to determine the enforceability of
clauses which deny claimants the right to change policies and prac-
tices—to decide, in other words, whether claimants may engage in a
form of public law litigation within the confines of arbitration. This
raises fundamental questions concerning the suitability of arbitration for
resolving issues that affect broadly-held rights, and ultimately, whether
19. See infra text accompanying notes 35–47 (describing differences in statutory violations
that might account for variation in remedies, from narrowly-tailored, individualized relief to
broader forms of relief).
20. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrylser-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
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the private attorney general can effectively operate in these private,
adjudicative arenas.21
II. INDIVIDUALIZED INJUNCTIONS
Anti-reform provisions are inserted into arbitration clauses to pro-
hibit an individual arbitral claimant from obtaining broad injunctive
relief benefitting herself and other similarly-situated non-parties. To
achieve this goal, corporate drafters use forceful and explicit language
demanding that only claims for individual injunctive relief may be
sought in the arbitral forum. The Amex clause provides a good working
example of an anti-reform clause that is both explicit and reiterative in
its prohibition against broad equitable relief:
“The arbitrator’s authority to resolve Claims is limited to Claims
between you and us alone, and the arbitrator’s authority to make
awards is limited to awards to you and us alone”;22
There is no right to arbitrate “ON BEHALF OF THE GENERAL
PUBLIC OR OTHER PARTIES”;23 and
“YOU AND WE SHALL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICI-
PATE IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY . . . PERTAINING
TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION.”24
Corporate drafters insist that contractual language such as this,
authorizing only individualized, bespoke injunctions, is entirely permis-
sible under the FAA; and, further, that such narrowly-tailored remedies
are all that is necessary to make a claimant whole.25 Just as each claim-
ant must arbitrate her specific claim for individualized monetary dam-
ages, each must singularly prove an entitlement to individualized
injunctive relief. Any relief beyond that which is necessary to make the
individual plaintiff whole would therefore be impermissibly over-
21. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 625–26 (“Over the past fifty years . . . we
have come to assume, quite correctly, that private actors will be the frontline enforcers in actions
redressing broadscale securities fraud, consumer fraud and deceptive trade practices, antitrust
violations . . . , civil rights violations and many other areas.”); see also Jaime Dodge, The Limits of
Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 725–26 (2011) (“[T]he traditional conception
of private enforcement as serving a dual public and private role is now being fundamentally
challenged by this new generation of procedural contracting, as parties can create provisions
that . . . decreas[e] overall enforcement.”).
22. CAA, supra note 9, § 7.d.iv.
23. Id.
24. Id. § 7.d.iii.
25. See, e.g., Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants, supra note 14, at 4–5
(“[O]btaining an individualized injunction would grant the merchant the very right he
seeks . . . and his relief would be complete. That the merchant may not seek relief for additional
non-parties is irrelevant.”); id. at 5 (“Thus, even if a plaintiff in bilateral arbitration could not
obtain the same broad, injunctive relief that might be available in litigation, the arbitration
provision must still be enforced according to its terms.”).
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broad.26 This view finds support in traditional rules mandating that
injunctive relief be narrowly tailored to remedy specific harms rather
than seek to “enjoin all possible breaches of the law,”27 and that an
injunction “should be no more burdensome to the defendant than neces-
sary to provide complete relief to plaintiffs.”28
For many legal violations, individualized injunctions are a suffi-
cient—indeed, paradigmatic—remedy for the harm suffered. For exam-
ple, in cases involving libel and defamation,29 domestic violence,30
noncriminal detention,31 public nuisance,32 patent,33 and a variety of
other rights violations, an individual victim will often seek a narrowly-
tailored injunction against future injury. Important statutory and com-
mon law rights of private individuals are secured through customized
injunctions of these sorts, often coupled with monetary damages to rem-
edy past misconduct.34 But there are many other types of legal rights
which are best, or perhaps only, safeguarded by a broader remedial
structure.
A. Broad Equitable Relief and Statutory Enforcement
There are a number of areas in which broad equitable relief is the
rule—for example, rights guaranteed by federal antitrust,35 employ-
26. Id. at 6 (while “the Clayton Act entitles [plaintiffs] to broad, market-wide injunctive relief
to remedy the alleged ‘harm to competition,’” plaintiffs must nonetheless “allege a specific,
personal injury-in-fact,” which “forms the predicate for a private antitrust claim”).
27. Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1370 (3d Cir. 1974) (quoting Hartford-Empire Co. v.
United States, 323 U.S. 386, 410 (1945)).
28. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
29. See, e.g., Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 56 (Ga. 1975) (noting the trial court
“entered a narrowly-drawn order enjoining [the defendant] from the further publication of the
adjudicated libel”).
30. In this context, injunctions are termed ‘restraining orders.’
31. But see Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225,
236 (2009) (describing ex ante grants of injunctive relief to individual detainees as “vanishingly
rare”); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 692 (2008) (reversing grant of injunctive relief to a detainee
who challenged his transfer to Iraq based on fears of torture).
32. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 404, at 644 (2d ed. 2014)
(“[C]ourts often issue injunctions compelling the defendant to abate private as well as public
nuisances. Injunctions may be tailored narrowly to fit the nuisance. If a factory operation is a
nuisance because of noise, it may be that an injunction closing the factory is unnecessary and that
the nuisance can be remedied by an injunction that bars or limits the noise. Such an approach
would properly match the remedy to the wrong.”).
33. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) than “Off Switches”: Patent-
Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1449–50 (2012) (an empirical study of
injunctions issued in patent infringement cases finding one-third were “specifically tailored” to the
individual plaintiff).
34. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972) (“While . . . any
individual threatened with injury by an antitrust violation may . . . sue for injunctive relief . . . one
injunction is as effective as 100 . . . .”).
35. See, e.g., Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2012) (“The several district courts of the
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ment,36 civil rights,37 and copyright and trademark legislation.38 These
statutory rights are defined at a higher level of generality than injury to
one, specific individual: they seek to protect publicly-held, group-based
rights deemed critical to the proper functioning of the economy, labor
markets, social programs, education, and property ownership. Where an
injunction issues in these areas, it “will necessarily affect all persons
subject to the statute.”39
For example, in the antitrust area, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly declared that the statutory remedies exist to protect “competition,
not competitors,”40 the “right of freedom to trade,”41 “equality of oppor-
tunity,”42 and “consumer welfare and price competition”43—using
United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this Act, and it
shall be the duty of the several United States attorneys, in their respective districts, under the
direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such
violations.”).
36. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2012) (“[T]he
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to
effectuate the purposes of this chapter . . . .”); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012) (“If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint . . . [the court
may grant] any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”).
37. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a) (2012) (allowing courts to grant
equitable relief if a Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment violation is found); Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3) (2012) (“If [an] administrative law judge finds
that a respondent has engaged . . . in a discriminatory housing practice, such administrative law
judge [may] promptly issue . . . equitable relief.”); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(A) (2012) (a court “may grant any equitable relief that such court considers
to be appropriate”).
38. See Daniel J. Walker, Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of Non-
Class Collective Relief, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1119, 1146 (2005) (“Some substantive legal areas
may warrant broad relief, even where the party’s individual injury might be remedied by a
narrower injunction.”).
39. Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
40. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); see also Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 133 (1969) (observing that a critical end to be served in
equitable suits under the Clayton Act is that “‘they effectively pry open to competition a market
that has been closed by defendants’ illegal restraints’”) (quoting Int’l Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947)).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
42. Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of the U.S. & Can., 260 U.S. 501, 512
(1923).
43. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993)
(noting “antitrust laws’ traditional concern for consumer welfare and price competition”); NCAA
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107, 104 n.27 (1984) (stating that “Congress
designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription,”’ and describing the federal
antitrust laws as “‘a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade’”) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
343 (1979), and N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1958)); United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (declaring the freedom for each business “to compete—to
assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster”).
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decidedly anti-individualistic, communal language to underscore the
“fundamental importance [of antitrust law] to American democratic cap-
italism.”44 There is a similar recognition of the public’s interest in the
values protected by employment45 and civil rights legislation, and the
remedies provided by those statutory enforcement regimes.46 In many of
these contexts, an individualized injunction benefiting only one victim
would make little sense given far-reaching statutory goals of remedying
group-based harms.47
Concomitantly, the judicial authority to craft appropriate remedies
in these sorts of cases matches the scope and diversity of the interests at
stake,48 which generally exceed any individual’s specific harm or even
the narrow scope of the right itself.49 As the Supreme Court observed
nearly eighty years ago, “[c]ourts of equity may, and frequently do, go
much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public
interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are
involved.”50 For instance, courts have changed policies, rewritten rules,
reformed practices, imposed new duties, and otherwise found ways of
44. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrylser-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985); see also
Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968) (“A claim under
the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act is designed to promote the
national interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his rights under the Act has
been likened to a private attorney-general who protects the public’s interest.”).
45. See, e.g., Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating
that Title VII allows individual claimants to seek broad injunctive relief to remedy violations);
Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 633–34 (9th Cir. 1972) (suggesting that in Title VII
actions, relief benefiting nonparties might be proper under the statute’s unusually broad remedial
scheme, while further observing that injunctive relief often “may incidentally benefit” others not
before the court); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32–33 (5th Cir. 1968) (stating that the
claim to remedy class-wide discriminatory employment practices “has extreme importance with
heavy overtones of public interest.”).
46. See, e.g., Prof’l Ass’n of College Educators v. El Paso Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 730 F.2d
258, 274 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that an injunction benefiting nonparties is permissible “if such
breadth is necessary to give prevailing parties the relief to which they [individually] are entitled”).
47. See, e.g., United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493
F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that “racial discrimination is by definition class
discrimination”); see also 7 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1771, at 663–64 (1972) (reporting that injunctive relief typically benefits “not
only the claimant but all other persons subject to the practice or the rule under attack”).
48. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 n.9 (1978) (observing that “‘breadth and
flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies’”) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)).
49. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 90 (1950) (stating that “relief, to be
effective, must go beyond the narrow limits of the proven violation”); see also United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250 (1968) (declaring that a remedies decree in an
antitrust case should “terminate the illegal monopoly, deny to the defendant the fruits of its
statutory violation, and ensure that there remain no practices likely to result in monopolization in
the future”).
50. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
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fully restoring an injured plaintiff via equitable remedies.51
B. The “Necessity” of Broad Equitable Relief
Despite these long-standing principles, which allow individuals to
seek broad injunctive relief in appropriate cases, putative defendants,
nonetheless, insist that anti-reform provisions are enforceable because
narrowly-tailored remedies are all that is necessary to make an individ-
ual claimant whole in a non-class case. These advocates point out that,
in order to avail herself of broad injunctive relief, the plaintiff must gen-
erally prove that such relief is “necessary” to remedying her specific
injury.52 If the plaintiff could be made whole by a different remedy—
e.g., monetary damages—then equitable remedies are not required.53
Furthermore, if a narrow injunction would render her fully whole, then
she lacks standing to seek a broader remedy on behalf of others.
At its core, this is a claim that injunctive relief is overbroad—even
where statutorily authorized—whenever such relief benefits similarly-
situated non-parties. But this argument rests on two faulty propositions:
first, that broad injunctive relief is unavailable in non-class cases; and,
second, that an injunctive remedy which benefits similarly-situated non-
parties is unnecessary or overbroad.
1. BROAD RELIEF IN NON-CLASS CASES
Corporate defendants generally assert that broad injunctive relief is
not available in non-class cases. Rather, it is only where a class is certi-
fied and liability established that a court may enter “appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
51. See, e.g., ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 557 (8th Cir. 1991) (asserting
that courts are “empowered to fashion appropriate restraints on [the defendant’s] future activities
both to avoid a recurrence of the violation and to eliminate its consequences,” and, therefore, “the
district court may consider both the ‘continuing effects of past illegal conduct,’ and the possibility
of ‘lingering efforts’ by the conspirators to capitalize on the benefits of their past illegal conduct”)
(citations omitted).
52. See, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (“The purpose of an
injunction is to prevent future violations . . . . But the moving party must satisfy the court that
relief is needed.”); Law v. NCAA, No. 94-2053-KHV, 1996 WL 104328, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 5
1996) (“In seeking injunctive relief, plaintiffs carry the burden of proving that such relief is
necessary.”).
53. Courts often recite the maxim that equity will not grant relief when there exists “an
adequate remedy at law.” See, e.g., Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1123–24 (5th Cir. 1976)
(parties whose injuries can be rectified by means other than a injunction have an adequate remedy
at law, and injunctive relief may be inappropriate); see also Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions
and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382, 393 (1982) (“[A]re there other non-
injunctive proceedings that are likely to repair, in a rough sense, the harm plaintiff seeks to avert
by injunction?”).
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class as a whole.”54 Thus, where an arbitration clause contains both class
action bans and anti-reform provisions, drafters have in essence barred
an individual claimant from seeking any form of broad relief.
A handful of cases have revealed discomfort with individual plain-
tiffs seeking broad equitable remedies in non-class cases. In Zepeda v.
INS, for example, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s pre-class
certification grant of a preliminary injunction as overbroad, reasoning
that the injunction should “apply only to the individual plaintiffs unless
the district judge certifies a class of plaintiffs.”55 According to the
Zepeda court, until a class is certified, the district judge simply had no
authority to “determine the rights of persons not before the court.”56 In
the dissent in Zepeda, Judge Norris forcefully asserted that “[w]hether or
not a class was certified is irrelevant to the question whether the scope
of the injunction . . . was necessary to protect the constitutional rights of
these individual plaintiffs.”57 In the dissenting judge’s view, an order
prohibiting the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) from
violating the rights of all Hispanic people was “necessary to protect” the
individual plaintiffs—a proposition he found amply supported by
precedent.58
A handful of cases have followed the formalism of the Zepeda
54. In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 415 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(2)); see also Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 730 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983) (observing that if “any
individual plaintiff suffer[ing] injury . . . could merely file an individual suit as a pseudo-private
attorney general and enjoin” wrongful conduct, “there would be no need for class actions”); id.
(“But our legal system does not automatically grant individual plaintiffs standing to act on behalf
of all citizens similarly situated. A person who desires to be a ‘self-chosen representative’ and
‘volunteer champion’ . . . must qualify under Rule 23.”) (citation omitted).
55. Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727; see also id. at 728 n.1 (quoting Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants Rights,
Inc. v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1984)) (“The INS asserts that in the absence of class
certification, the preliminary injunction may properly cover only the named plaintiffs. We
agree.”).
56. Id. at 727; see also id. at 728 (citing Hollon v. Mathis Indep. School Dist., 491 F.2d 92,
93 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)) (noting that an injunction restraining enforcement of school
regulation as to similarly-situated students was an abuse of discretion and not necessary to
preserve the status quo in the absence of a class certification); Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360,
1366 (3d Cir. 1974) (“Relief cannot be granted to a class before an order has been entered
determining that class treatment is proper.”).
57. Id. at 734 (Norris, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (citing United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493
F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir. 1974)) (“We find it unnecessary to determine the answer to this question
[whether the district court abused its discretion in denying class action treatment], however, for
whether or not appellants are entitled to class action treatment, the decree to which they are
entitled is the same. . . . [T]he very nature of the rights appellants seek to vindicate requires that
the decree run to the benefit not only of the named plaintiffs but also for all persons similarly
situated.”); see also James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 186 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that denial of class
certification was not an abuse of discretion because the relief sought by individual plaintiffs “will,
as a practical matter, produce the same result as formal class-wide relief”), rev’d on other
grounds, 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
2015] INDIVIDUALIZED INJUNCTIONS & NO-MODIFICATION TERMS 481
majority opinion, denying broad injunctive relief in the absence of class
certification.59 But the vast majority of courts have been untroubled by
the absence of a class certification order, reasoning that any relief sought
by an individual litigant will unavoidably benefit all similarly-situated
non-parties, class or no class.60 In Davy v. Sullivan, for example, the
court recognized that any equitable relief granted the plaintiff “will nec-
59. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Reno, 91 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 1996) (modifying an injunction
to apply only to the named plaintiff until the district court certifies a class); Brown v. Trs. of
Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 361 (1st Cir. 1989) (narrowing a broad injunction against sex
discrimination so that it protected only the plaintiff); Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union,
549 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that “denial of class certification foreclose[d] the
broad injunctive relief sought on behalf of the class”); Schultz v. Armstrong, No. 3:12-cv-00058,
2012 WL 3201223, at *3–4 (D. Idaho Aug. 2, 2012) (quoting Zepeda, 753 F.2d 719) (“[W]ithout
a properly certified class, a court cannot grant relief on a class-wide basis.”); United States v.
Cipinko, No. C-93-4236-VRW, 1994 WL 589455, at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 1994) (same); Wagner
v. Duffy, 700 F. Supp. 935, 948 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating that “[r]elief for the plaintiffs may be
accomplished on a very individual level,” and “such relief is not inevitably identical to class-wide
relief”).
60. See, e.g., Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1104 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Because relief for the
named plaintiffs in this case would also necessarily extend to all federal inmates, the district court
did not err in granting wide-ranging injunctive relief prior to certifying a nationwide class of
plaintiffs.”); Ray v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 908 F.2d 1549, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990) (remarking that
“[c]ertifying a class for the plaintiffs’ [Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)] claims . . . would
serve no purpose because information released . . . under FOIA is equally available to any [other]
person who requests it”), rev’d on other grounds, 502 U.S. 164 (1991); Dionne v. Bouley, 757
F.2d 1344, 1356 (1st Cir. 1985) (concluding that “a court may properly take into account . . . the
fact . . . that the same relief can, for all practical purposes, be obtained through an individual
injunction without the complications of a class action”); Sandford v. R.L. Coleman Realty Co.,
Inc., 573 F.2d 173, 178 (4th Cir. 1978) (“Since the plaintiffs could receive the same injunctive
relief in their individual action as they sought by the filing of their proposed class action, class
certification was unnecessary in order to give the plaintiffs the injunctive relief they requested
through class certification, assuming the facts of the case were sufficiently flagrant to support that
relief.”) (citation omitted); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc., 493 F.2d at 812
(“Even with the denial of class action status, the requested injunctive and declaratory relief will
benefit not only the individual appellants and the nonprofit corporation but all other persons
subject to the practice under attack.”); Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973)
(“[A]n action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials on the ground of
unconstitutionality of a statute or administrative practice is the archetype of one where class action
designation is largely a formality . . . .”); United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 1972)
(“The judgment in a school case, as in other civil rights actions, inures to the benefit of a large
class of persons, regardless of whether the original action is cast in the form of a class action.”);
Hall v. Burger King Corp., No. 1:89-cv-00260, 1992 WL 372354, at *11–12 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26,
1992) (quoting Lucky v. Bd. of Regents, No. 79-2420-civ-JWK, 1981 WL 234, at *8 (S.D. Fla.
June 29, 1981)) (observing that “class certification is unnecessary when an individual can obtain
injunctive or declaratory relief which would benefit the other class members because ‘the relief
ordered in connection with an individual’s claim or action insofar as the Court may direct the
defendant to make changes of such criteria or practices would of necessity inure to the benefit of
others’”); Gray v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 73 F.R.D. 638, 640 (D.D.C. 1977) (citing D.C.
Podiatry Soc’y v. District of Columbia, 65 F.R.D. 113, 115 (D.D.C. 1974) (stating that “there
exists no need for this case to be certified as a class action. . . . [W]hen . . . ‘the relief being sought
can be fashioned in such a way that it will have the same purpose and effect as a class action,’ the
certification of a class action is unnecessary and inappropriate”).
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essarily affect all persons subject to the statute—whether formally com-
bined as a class or not.”61 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held in Bresgal v.
Brock that “an injunction is not necessarily made overbroad by
extending benefit or protection to persons other than prevailing parties in
the lawsuit—even if it is not a class action—if such breadth is necessary
to give prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled.”62 And the
court in Perez-Funez v. INS directly rejected Zepeda, finding that a
determination that INS procedures had violated the constitutional rights
of the individual plaintiffs would automatically render “the continued
implementation of those procedures with respect to all the class [and
non-class] members . . . prohibited as violative of their constitutional
rights as well.”63
Even in areas far afield from civil rights and anti-discrimination
law, courts have generally authorized broad injunctive relief in non-class
cases.64 In Wilk v. American Medical Ass’n, for example, four chiroprac-
tors successfully sued the American Medical Association (“AMA”) for
engaging in an unlawful, multi-decade group boycott, and sought an
injunction, under § 16 of the Clayton Act, requiring broad publication
and mailing of the court order to all member physicians.65 The AMA
61. Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
62. Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 1987).
63. Perez-Funez v. INS, 611 F. Supp. 990, 998–99 (C.D. Cal. 1984). The Perez-Funez court
went further yet, asserting that “there must be some necessity for class certification: where the
relief, if granted to the plaintiff in his individual capacity only, would inure to the benefit of the
entire proposed class, the class need not be certified.” Id. at 995. See also Alliance to End
Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 980–81 (7th Cir. 1977) (affirming denial of class
certification, but observing that “it is important to note whether the suit is attacking a statute or
regulation as being facially unconstitutional. If so, then there would appear to be little need for the
suit to proceed as a class action.”); United States v. Bexar Cnty., 484 F. Supp. 855, 858 (W.D.
Tex. 1980) (denying motion for class certification on the grounds “certification was unnecessary,
in that the very nature of the rights plaintiffs sought to vindicate required that the decree run to the
benefit of plaintiffs as well as all persons similarly situated”).
64. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998) (enjoining NCAA rules
regarding damage caps for coaches); Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 87-cv-
01686, 1996 WL 101173, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163,
1170–71 (9th Cir. 1987)) (similarly rejecting the argument that an injunction was overbroad
insofar as there was no class action. Instead, it followed established precedent that “an injunction
is not necessarily made over-broad by extending benefit or protection to persons other than
prevailing parties in the lawsuit—even if it is not a class action—if such breadth is necessary to
give prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled.”), aff’d in relevant part, 125 F.3d 1195
(9th Cir. 1997).
65. Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 366–70 (7th Cir. 1990). The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant “engaged in a conspiracy to eliminate the chiropractic profession by refusing to
deal with” chiropractors and prohibiting member physicians from associating with “chiropractors
by labeling them unscientific practitioners.” Id. at 355. The injunction required the AMA to
publish the court’s order in the Journal of the American Medical Association, mail the order to
each of the AMA’s members, and revise the current opinions of the AMA’s Council on Judicial
and Ethical Affairs to state the group’s present position on chiropractic care. Id. at 371. In issuing
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appealed, in part, on the ground that the injunction was overbroad: the
case had been brought by only four plaintiffs, yet the injunctive relief
would benefit “some 30,000 chiropractors in the nation . . . who were
not parties to this case.”66 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that
the AMA’s argument ignored “the public interest served by private anti-
trust suits” as a means of “effectively opening competition to a market
that was previously closed by illegal restraints.”67 While the injunctive
relief might inure to the benefit of those beyond the four plaintiff chiro-
practors, including “all consumers of health care services,”68 the appeals
court deemed such relief necessary to remedy the harm.69 Other courts
have followed this logic in the antitrust context.70
2. COLLATERAL BENEFICIARIES AND THE INDIVISIBILITY
OF EQUITABLE RELIEF
A second claim made by advocates of anti-reform provisions is that
an injunctive remedy which benefits similarly-situated non-parties is
unnecessary or overbroad. A claimant can only seek relief as to her indi-
vidual, specific injury—not the injuries of others.71 On this view, a con-
the injunction, the court found the AMA had “never made any attempt to publicly repair” the
injury to chiropractors’ reputations as a result of the boycott, such that broad publication and
notice were required to remedy the full extent of plaintiffs’ injury. Id. at 369.
66. Id. at 371. According to the AMA, “an injunction in a private antitrust suit should award a
plaintiff injunctive relief ‘only to the extent necessary to protect it from future damage likely to
occur if the defendant continues the unlawful antitrust conduct.’” Id. at 370 (citing Ohio-Sealy
Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 669 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1982)). As such, it argued that the
injunction should be “limited to the four communities in which the individual plaintiffs practiced,”
rather than a nationwide, industry-wide publication campaign. Id. at 371.
67. Id. at 371 (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 698 (1978));
see also Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947) (stating that equitable suits under
the Clayton Act “effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants’
illegal restraints”).
68. Wilk, 895 F.2d at 370–71. The court also rejected defendant’s argument that the broad
injunction was improper in the absence of a class action. Id. at 371 n.6.
69. Id. at 370.
70. See Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550 (E.D. Va.
2001), vacated on other grounds, 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Wilk, 895 F.2d at 371)
(“[B]ecause the harm to be prevented here—as in all private antitrust cases—goes beyond the
harm occasioned on the individual plaintiff and extends to the harm to open, unfettered
competition as a whole, the injunctive relief granted in this case should ‘effectively pry open
competition to a market that was previously closed by illegal restraints’ and should not myopically
focus solely on Continental’s harm.”); Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d
1195, 1226 (9th Cir. 1997) (observing that “injunctive relief covering nonparty” beneficiaries is
proper to prevent harm to competition).
71. See, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (“The purpose of an
injunction is to prevent future violations . . . . But the moving party must satisfy the court that
relief is needed.”); Law v. NCAA, No. 94-2053-KHV, 1996 WL 104328, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 5,
1996) (“In seeking injunctive relief, plaintiffs carry the burden of proving that such relief is
necessary.”).
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tractual prohibition against seeking such broad remedies comports with
existing justiciability requirements. But, as many courts have held, the
fact that an injunctive remedy benefits others does not, in and of itself,
render it unnecessary or overbroad. Indeed, in many cases, it is inevita-
ble that an injunctive remedy necessary to make an individual plaintiff
whole will also inure to the benefit of similarly-situated nonparties.
A leading case is Bailey v. Patterson, where individual African-
American plaintiffs successfully enjoined the enforcement of statutes
and practices permitting unconstitutional segregation in transportation
facilities; defendants challenged the injunctive decree as overbroad
because it granted relief to all African-Americans—which was not “nec-
essary” to remedy the specific plaintiffs’ injuries.72 The court disagreed,
finding that “[t]he very nature of the rights appellants [sought] to vindi-
cate requires that the decree run to the benefit[,] not only of appellants[,]
but also for all persons similarly situated.”73 In other words, the only
way to ensure that plaintiffs could ride on desegregated buses was to
desegregate the entire transportation system: these plaintiffs did not
want to be the only African-Americans riding in the white section of the
bus, they wanted an end to a “white section” altogether. An extensive
desegregation order which benefited other similarly-situated African-
Americans was therefore necessary to remedy the specific harm to
plaintiffs.74
In cases such as Bailey, it is impossible or undesirable to tailor
injunctive relief so narrowly as to benefit only the named plaintiffs in a
suit—but this is not an argument against awarding the necessary relief.
For example, in Bresgal v. Brock, the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction
requiring the Secretary of Labor to enforce the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act against forestry labor contractors
nationwide.75 Though the plaintiffs were individual migrant laborers, the
court could not order enforcement of the act “only against those contrac-
tors who have dealings with named plaintiffs.”76 The same court upheld
a statewide injunction requiring the California Highway Patrol to alter
72. Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1963).
73. Id. at 206; see also Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 289 n.5 (5th Cir. 1963) (citing Bush v.
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 1962)) (observing that “a school segregation
suit presents more than a claim of invidious discrimination to individuals by reason of a universal
policy of segregation. It involves a discrimination against a class as a class, and this is assuredly
appropriate for class relief.”).
74. See Potts, 313 F.2d at 289 (observing that to issue an individualized injunction requiring
“a school system to admit the specific successful plaintiff Negro child while others, having no
such protection, were required to attend schools in a racially segregated system, would be for the
court to contribute actively” to the illegal conduct sought to be enjoined).
75. See Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 1171.
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its ticketing policy for motorcycle helmet infractions.77 The court held
that an injunction limited to the fourteen named plaintiffs in the case
would not afford them complete relief because “it is unlikely that law
enforcement officials . . . would inquire before citation into whether a
motorcyclist was among the named plaintiffs . . . .”78
Subsequently, courts have widely adopted these rationales in a wide
range of contexts.79 And, while “necessity” may remain a litigable
issue—one that is highly dependent on the statutory enforcement author-
ity and the facts of an individual case80—an ex ante, across-the-board
proscription against even seeking broad injunctive relief cannot be
enforceable under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA.
C. Challenging Individualized Injunction Provisions
The primary challenge to individualized injunction language in
anti-reform provisions would contend that where a plaintiff can show a
statutory entitlement to broad injunctive relief—for example, under Sec-
tion 16 of the Clayton Act or Section 706 of Title VII—the inability
even to pursue such a remedy constitutes a prospective waiver of statu-
tory rights. As the Supreme Court held thirty years ago in Mitsubishi
Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, prospective litigants must be
afforded an opportunity to vindicate their statutory rights in an arbitral
forum; otherwise, statutes will cease to “serve both remedial and deter-
rent function[s].”81 Under Mitsubishi and its progeny, an arbitration
clause is unenforceable where it “operat[es] . . . as a prospective waiver
77. See Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1501–02 (9th Cir. 1996).
78. Id. at 1502.
79. See 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 47, at 663–64 (observing that injunctive relief
typically benefits “not only the claimant but all other persons subject to the practice or the rule
under attack”). See generally James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 186 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding a law
that allowed only landowners to vote to elect directors of a water district, saying that the lower
court did not abuse it’s discretion in “refusing to certify the suit as a class action” because “the
relief sought [would have] . . . produce[d] the same result as formal class-wide relief”), rev’d on
other grounds, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); Sandford v. R.L. Coleman Realty Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 173,
178 (4th Cir. 1978) (“Since the plaintiffs could receive the same injunctive relief in their
individual action as they sought by the filing of their proposed class action, class certification was
unnecessary in order to give the plaintiffs the injunctive relief they requested . . . , assuming the
facts of the case were sufficiently flagrant to support that relief.”); United Farmworkers of Fla.
Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir. 1974) (“Even with the
denial of class action status, the requested injunctive and declaratory relief will benefit not only
the individual appellants . . . but all other persons subject to the practice under attack.”).
80. See, e.g., Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 728–30 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Such broad relief is
not necessary to remedy the rights of the individual plaintiffs; if the scope of the injunction is
narrowed, there is no question that the individual plaintiffs will be protected from the INS’s
former practices. That is all the relief to which they are entitled. They are not entitled to relief for
people whom they do not represent.”).
81. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrylser-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
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of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies . . . .”82
This vindication-of-rights/prospective-waiver challenge was ren-
dered less robust by the Supreme Court’s decision in Italian Colors,
where five Justices rejected the plaintiffs’ cost-based challenge to a class
action ban embedded within an arbitration clause.83 But the Italian Col-
ors majority did not overrule Mitsubishi, nor did it repudiate the vindica-
tion-of-rights challenge.84 Indeed, the Court reiterated its long-held view
that an arbitration clause that would require a “prospective waiver of a
party’s right to pursue statutory remedies” is unenforceable, and specif-
ically observed that a vindication of rights challenge would sound in the
case of “a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion
of certain statutory rights.”85 This comports with decisions in the lower
federal courts finding that arbitration provisions that forbid the assertion
of statutory rights may constitute an unenforceable waiver.86
So, back to our individual, small merchant seeking to enjoin
82. Id. at 637 n.19; see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273–74 (2009);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991); McDonald v. City of West
Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (finding arbitration clause which prohibited claimant from
pursuing a § 1983 claim in court unenforceable because, “in a § 1983 action, an arbitration
proceeding cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial trial”); Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (“[Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)] rights
cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would ‘nullify the purposes’ of
the statute . . . .”); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (“[W]e think it clear
that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII.”).
83. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (“[T]he antitrust
laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”).
84. Rather, the majority in Italian Colors conceded the force of the vindication-of-rights
challenge, but found it had not been met in a case where the plaintiffs alleged that their inability to
fund litigation via the class action device constituted a waiver of their federal statutory rights. Id.
at 2311 (“[T]he fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does
not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”) (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 2310. He continued: “And it would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees
attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable.” Id. at
2310–11.
86. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Fisher, No. DKC 11-2245, 2011 WL 5169349, at *5 (D.
Md. Oct. 28, 2011) (cautioning that AT&T’s interpretation that “customers also waived any right
to bring this type of action anywhere, including in court,” may well “violate public policy and be
unenforceable”); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2006) (severing waiver
of treble damages); Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 n.14 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that
waiver of exemplary and punitive damages is unenforceable); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs.,
Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1059–60 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that an arbitration agreement cannot force
a party to arbitrate a statutory right and at the same time bar it from being awarded damages in the
arbitral forum); EEOC v. Townley Eng’g. & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615–17 (9th Cir. 1988)
(stating that prospective waiver in an employment contract “would undermine Title VII’s policy
of eradicating discrimination in employment”); Schwartz v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901,
906 (11th Cir. 1987); Rogers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 1986) (“The release
executed by [plaintiff] did not prospectively waive Title VII claims.”); Williams v. Vukovich, 720
F.2d 909, 926 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that “prospective waiver of [Title VII] right would defeat
the purpose behind Title VII”).
2015] INDIVIDUALIZED INJUNCTIONS & NO-MODIFICATION TERMS 487
Amex’s anticompetitive rules in the arbitral forum: that plaintiff, upon
successfully proving that the complained-of rules restrained trade, would
only be entitled to an individualized injunction under Amex’s anti-
reform provisions. That injunction might allow that individual small
merchant to escape Amex’s rules, but it would do nothing to reduce
prices across the board, lower barriers to entry, or destroy the defen-
dant’s monopoly power. Indeed, even if ten-thousand individual small
merchants brought the identical claims in arbitration, all seeking to
enjoin the exact same anticompetitive rules, anti-reform provisions in
each of their card acceptance agreements would limit each to an individ-
ualized injunction. No single merchant—no matter how big or small or
determined—could achieve across-the-market relief.
But what if our individual small merchant sought to first challenge
Amex’s anti-reform provisions on the grounds that prohibitions against
broad injunctive relief constitute a prospective waiver of statutory
rights?87 What if this claimant argued that the only way it could be made
whole was to level the playing field by knocking out Amex’s rules
across the board? If broad injunctive relief is “necessary” to remedy this
claimant’s injury, then the anti-reform provision operates as an unen-
forceable prospective waiver of rights.
This challenge is available to a wide range of claimants seeking to
remedy violations of antitrust, employment, civil rights, and other stat-
utes, which provide for broad equitable relief, and where a showing of
“necessity” can be made.88
III. NO-MODIFICATION TERMS
In addition to individualized injunctions, anti-reform provisions
demand that arbitrators, in granting relief, refrain from changing, modi-
fying, or altering the underlying agreement. Again, the Amex clause is
illustrative: “the Arbitrator shall have no power or authority to alter the
87. Indeed, it may be possible for a small merchant claimant to mount a substantive challenge
to anti-reform provisions on the grounds that prohibitions against broad injunctive relief
constitute, in and of themselves, anticompetitive rules in violation of the Sherman Act. See Italian
Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Amex has insulated itself from antitrust
liability—even if it has in fact violated the law. The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to
insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse.”).
88. A successful challenge to the individualized injunction language would result in either
severance of these provisions from the arbitration clause or a declaration that the entire arbitration
clause is void. Corporate drafters might well prefer the latter, which would at least provide them
procedural protections in court, rather than leaving them vulnerable to the vagaries of unregulated
arbitration. Defendants’ unease with being relegated to arbitration without the protection of anti-
reform provisions is expressed in accompanying “blow-up” clauses, which contend that, in the
event an anti-reform clause is deemed unenforceable, the entire arbitration clause becomes
inoperative and the parties may bring their all claims in court. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC, 2011
WL 5169349, at *5–6 (describing AT&T’s blow-up provision).
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Agreement or any of its separate provisions.”89 Under this no-modifica-
tion clause, should an individual small merchant seek rescission of
Amex’s anti-competitive rules, the arbitrator would be barred from
granting such relief because it would require modification of the under-
lying terms of the card acceptance agreement. Nonetheless, corporate
drafters contend that these provisions are valid and enforceable, and that
the provisions do not significantly impinge upon arbitral authority to
grant necessary relief to an individual claimant; rather, they argue that
no-modification provisions merely prevent an arbitrator from grafting
new provisions onto the contract or rewriting the contract to add new
terms.90
Advocates of this view draw heavily from labor cases, where no-
modification clauses have been standard in collective bargaining agree-
ments for decades,91 and where defendant employers have long relied on
such clauses to ensure that arbitrators do not exceed their contractually-
defined authority.92
A. No-Modification Clauses in Labor Agreements
The traditional concern in labor cases was that an arbitrator might
impose a substantive “condition not bargained for by the parties” or
might nullify “sections of the collective bargaining agreement.”93 Defen-
89. CAA, supra note 9, § 7.d.vi.
90. See, e.g., Vera v. Saks, 335 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting arbitration
agreement in Saks’ collective bargaining agreement, which provided that, “in any arbitration, the
arbitrator shall be bound by the terms of this agreement and shall have no authority to add to,
subtract from, change or modify any provision of the agreement”); Cleveland Wrecking Co. v.
Iron Workers Local 40, 136 F.3d 884, 889 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding a ‘no-modification’ clause
“simply cautions that the general arbitration provisions should not be interpreted to ‘qualify’ or
‘change’ any other aspect of the [collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)]” because,
“notwithstanding the informal, often freewheeling, nature of arbitration, arbitrators are not at
liberty to depart from or to vary the terms of the agreement”).
91. In re Kraft Foods Co., 6 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 962, 964 (1947) (observing that these
clauses commonly provide that the arbitrator shall not “change, alter, modify, or add to any of the
terms or provisions of [the] agreement”); Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers Union Local
1645, 362 F.2d 677, 680 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding that no-modification clauses in labor agreements
must be carefully scrutinized to determine restraints on arbitrator authority).
92. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (no-
modification clauses remind arbitrators that their duty is to interpret and apply the agreement as
negotiated, and that they may not reform the contract to do “industrial justice”); Harry Hoffman
Printing v. Graphic Comm. Int’l Union, Local 261, 950 F.2d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Arbitrators
may imply terms or fill gaps in an agreement, but a ‘no modification’ clause prohibits them from
creating entirely new terms.”); Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 186 (7th
Cir. 1985) (finding that “emphatic ‘no modification’ provision in the arbitration clause” precluded
the arbitrator from modifying the underlying contract).
93. Andrew M. Campbell, Construction and Application of § 10(a)(4) of Federal Arbitration
Act (9 USCS § 10(a)(4)) Providing for Vacating of Arbitration Awards Where Arbitrators Exceed
or Imperfectly Execute Powers, 136 A.L.R. FED. 183, § 16(c) (1997).
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dant-employers generally worried that labor arbitrators with too-broad
authority might grant too-broad relief, altering the terms of a carefully-
negotiated union deal. No-modification clauses, operating in conjunction
with explicit limitations on available remedies, provided contractual
control over arbitral authority to fashion remedies.94
When a labor arbitrator’s award is challenged on the grounds that
she violated the no-modification clause,95 courts apply an extremely def-
erential standard of review, adhering to the Supreme Court’s admonition
to avoid second-guessing the merits of an arbitrator’s performance.96
Often, courts in this posture simply examine the terms of the no-modifi-
cation clause to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded the bounds of
the agreement to arbitrate.97 Not all courts agree, however, as to what
constitutes overstepping these bounds.98 For example, in the landmark
94. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Ubersax, Arbitration for the Trial Lawyer, 40 LITIG. 37, 43 (2013)
(defendants “argue that the relief being sought in the arbitration is so inconsistent with the plain
terms of the contract that to grant it would be to change the contract—something that the
arbitrators are without power to do”).
95. Under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA, courts may vacate arbitration awards “where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012).
96. See, e.g., Misco, 484 U.S. at 38 (“as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority,” a court may not disturb his
judgment even if it is “convinced he committed serious error”); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (saying the proper role of the judiciary in
labor arbitration cases is not “to review the merits of an arbitration award,” but to determine
whether it exceeded the limits of the arbitrator’s contractual authority); see also Haw. Teamsters
& Allied Workers Union, Local 966 v. United Parcel Serv., 241 F.3d 1177, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“[W]e have no grounds to upset [the arbitrator’s] conclusions. We decline to opine whether the
arbitrator ‘misinterpreted’ the [collective bargaining agreement]; that is simply not our role.
Recognizing the extreme deference owed to a labor arbitrator’s decision, we affirm . . . .”);
McKinney v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 954 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is the keystone of
the national labor policy announced in the Steelworkers trilogy, that skilled labor arbitrators,
rather than judges, are better positioned and equipped to identify and to apply the common law of
the shop.”); Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997)
(reaffirming the view that courts are not to “second guess an arbitrator’s resolution of a contract
dispute”). The phrase “Steelworkers Trilogy” refers to three Supreme Court decisions from 1960.
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
97. See, e.g., Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. Marine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n, 889 F.2d 599,
602 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts are free to scrutinize the award to ensure that the arbitrator
acted in conformity with the jurisdictional prerequisites of the collective bargaining agreement.”);
Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd., 184 P.3d 739, 743 (Cal. 2008) (analyzing whether the no-
modification clause was sufficiently “explicit[ ] and unambiguous” to bar the arbitrator from
reforming the contract’s notice-and-cure provision); S.F. Hous. Auth. v. SEIU Local 790, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 62, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that “the dispositive question before us is whether the
remedy imposed by the arbitrator was ‘even arguably based on the contract’ or, stated otherwise,
whether the award ‘conflicts with express terms of the arbitrated contract’”) (citing Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal. 4th 362, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).
98. See Loveless v. E. Airlines, Inc., 681 F.2d 1272, 1277 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001) (reviewing
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case, Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers Local 1645, an arbitra-
tor tasked with resolving a labor dispute determined that, despite the
absence of any express provision in the agreement, the employer was
obligated to provide employees a paid day off to vote.99 The employer
challenged the award on the grounds that it violated the no-modification
clause, and both the district and circuit courts agreed, finding the arbitra-
tor had surpassed his contractually delimited authority in granting relief
not contemplated by the agreement.100
In contrast, many other courts have been reluctant to vacate arbitral
awards, which are grounded, however minimally, in the “essence” of the
underlying agreement.101 These courts accord arbitrators broad authority
to consider extrinsic sources in order to clarify ambiguous contract pro-
visions and great flexibility in fashioning appropriate remedies.102
B. Altering Substantive Provisions vs. Crafting Remedies
A number of early decisions reviewing labor arbitrations involved
contracts that did not explicitly limit the remedies available.103 In this
precedent on whether a “standard ‘no modification’ clause restricts the authority of the arbitrator
to go beyond the express terms of the contract”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 492 F.2d 713, 731 (5th Cir. 1974) (explaining that standard no-modification clauses do not
restrict arbitrator’s authority); Dall. Typographical Union, No. 173 v. A.H. Belo Corp., 372 F.2d
577, 583 (5th Cir. 1967) (Torrington should be “carefully confined lest, under the guise of the
arbitrator not having ‘authority’ to arrive at his ill-founded conclusions of law or fact, or both, the
reviewing-enforcing court takes over the arbitrator’s function.”); Lodge No. 12, Dist. No. 37, Int’l
Ass’n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 292 F.2d 112, 118 (5th Cir. 1961) (no-
modification clause does not prevent an arbitrator from finding rights implied though not
expressed in the collective bargaining agreement).
99. 362 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1966). The arbitrator looked to the industrial common law—
the practices of the industry and the shop—in finding that “the benefit of paid time off to vote was
a firmly established practice at Torrington.” Id.; see also Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at
580 (“Gaps may be left to be filled in by reference to the practices of the particular industry and of
the various shops covered by the agreement.”).
100. Torrington, 362 F.2d at 679 (noting that the district court had determined that “the
arbitrator had gone outside the terms of the contract and thus had exceeded his authority by
reading the election day benefit into the new contract”).
101. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960) (finding that courts are obliged to enforce an arbitral award, even when they disagreed with
it, so long as it found its “essence in the collective bargaining agreement” that gave the arbitrator
his or her authority); Mut. Redevelopment Houses, Inc. v. Local 32B-32J, Serv. Emps. Int’l
Union, 700 F. Supp. 774, 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that the remedy fashioned by the arbitrator
was within the contemplated scope of the agreement and drawn from the essence of that
agreement, which provided broadly that the arbitrator had the power to award appropriate
remedies).
102. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local Union No. 7001,
588 F.2d 127, 130–31 (5th Cir. 1970) (no-modification clause does not prevent an arbitrator from
being able to look at extrinsic evidence); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Distillery Workers Int’l Union, 412
F.2d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 1969) (finding a no-modification clause places no additional limits on an
arbitrator’s powers).
103. See, e.g., Sverdrup/ARO, Inc. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 532 F. Supp. 143, 146–47
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context, it was arguably simpler for reviewing courts to grant arbitrators
greater flexibility in fashioning appropriate remedies that may not have
been contemplated by the agreement, but were also not explicitly barred.
Contemporary anti-reform provisions do, however, impose significant
limitations on remedies—i.e., the prohibitions against broad injunctive
relief discussed in Part II—forcing courts to consider whether an arbitra-
tor’s exercise of remedial authority in contravention to these specified
terms violates a no-modification clause.
This inquiry implicates policy-based challenges to anti-reform
clauses. Specifically, where a claimant can prove an entitlement to equi-
table relief in the form of striking a contractual term or changing an
underlying rule, denying the arbitrator authority to grant such relief
thwarts the claimant’s ability to vindicate her statutory rights. At mini-
mum, fair adjudication requires a decisionmaker with the authority to
issue statutorily-authorized remedies because “[b]road declarations of
statutory rights are meaningless absent effective remedies for the viola-
tion of those rights.”104 As such, no-modification clauses operate to
exculpate the defendant from liability by precluding claimants from
seeking appropriate relief for their injuries.
Some courts have implicitly concurred with this view in deciding
that “the fashioning of an appropriate remedy is not an addition to the
obligations imposed by the contract.”105 On this view, where an arbitra-
tor orders remedies to “vindicate a violated right”—even where such
remedies are explicitly prohibited by the underlying agreement—this
exercise of remedial authority does not violate the no-modification
clause.106 Confirming this view, the Fourth Circuit held in Tobacco
Workers Int’l Union, Local 317 v. Lorillard Corp. that “[p]art of what
(E.D. Tenn. 1980) (holding that although a collective bargaining agreement did not expressly
authorize compensation as an award, it did not expressly prohibit it either, and therefore the
arbitrator did not exceed his authority by fashioning a remedy requiring overtime compensation
for work that was done in violation of the original agreement); S.D. Warren Co. v. United
Paperworkers’ Int’l Union, Local 1069, 845 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 1988) (vacating arbitral award
where the unambiguous language of the agreement’s management rights clause prohibited the
arbitrator from determining remedies for violations of the agreement and contained a no-
modification clause); Collins & Aikman Floor Coverings Corp. v. Froehlich, 736 F. Supp. 480,
484 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (vacating arbitral award of past commissions where the employment
agreement specifically stated that no post-termination commissions were to be awarded and
contained a no-modification clause).
104. Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law
Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 665 (1995).
105. Tobacco Workers Int’l Union, Local 317 v. Lorillard Corp., 448 F.2d 949, 956 (4th Cir.
1971) (emphasis added).
106. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express &
Station Employees, 657 F.2d 596, 601 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing Bhd. of R.R. Signalmen of Am. v. S.
Ry. Co., 380 F.2d 59, 68 (4th Cir. 1967)) (stating that an arbitration panel is not restricted to the
strict language of a collective bargaining agreement in crafting remedies).
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the parties bargain for when they include an arbitration provision in a
labor agreement is the ‘informed judgment’ that the arbitrator can bring
to bear on a grievance, especially as to the formulation of remedies.”107
This approach allows courts to uphold the arbitration clause while deny-
ing its remedy-stripping capacity.
For example, in United Steelworkers of America v. United States
Gypsum Co., the arbitrator found an employer had violated a CBA that
required the employer to negotiate a wage increase with the union and,
as a remedy, ordered the defendant to pay the increase based on the
arbitrator’s own calculation of what a fair negotiation would have pro-
duced.108 On review, the court held that the ordered wage increase did
not violate either the no-modification or the liability-limiting clauses
because the arbitrator did not “add[ ] terms to the contract. In the context
present here, [the arbitrator’s] action merely represent[ed] an attempt to
make the union whole for the damage suffered as a result of Gypsum’s
breach of the collective bargaining agreement.”109 Some courts have fol-
lowed Lorillard and United States Gypsum in reviewing challenges to
arbitral awards based on no-modification clauses.110
In contrast, other courts have held that an arbitrator does act beyond
the scope of his authority as defined by a no-modification clause when
ordering relief that is specifically prohibited by the agreement.111 These
107. Tobacco Workers Int’l Union, Local 317, 448 F.2d at 956 (citing United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
108. 492 F.2d 713, 728–29 (5th Cir. 1974).
109. Id. at 730. See also Local 879, Allied Indus. Workers of Am. v. Chrysler Marine Corp.,
819 F.2d 786, 788–90 (7th Cir. 1987) (despite no-modification clause, arbitrator’s imposition of a
severance plan not provided for in the CBA to compensate for Chrysler’s failure to hold required
negotiations prior to the plant closing was valid under the arbitrator’s power to determine breach,
which “implies the authority to prescribe a remedy which can be said reasonably to cure the
breach”).
110. See, e.g., Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 1006–08 (Cal.
1994) (reviewing arbitral award of a permanent, royalty-free license to a claimant who proved
breach of warranty of good faith, the California Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument
that “arbitrators may not award a party benefits different from those the party could have acquired
through performance of the contract,” and concluded that the permanent license remedy was
“rationally drawn from the arbitrator’s conception of the contract’s subject matter and the effects”
of the breach on the claimant); Timegate Studios, Inc. v. Southpeak Interactive, LLC, 713 F.3d
797, 801–03, 807 (5th Cir. 2013) (reversing and remanding a district court’s determination that an
arbitrator’s creation of a perpetual license remedy was not rationally rooted in a given contract,
and finding that despite the no-modification clause, the perpetual license remedy was a rational
remedy that furthered the general aims of the agreement).
111. Under the FAA, an arbitration award may be vacated when “arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter was not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4); Amanda Bent Bolt Co. v. UAW, Local 1549, 451 F.2d
1277, 1280 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding that the FAA “provides for the vacating of an arbitration
award if the arbitrator exceeds his powers”); see also Local 1837, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
Local 175 v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 182 F.3d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Teamsters, Local Union No. 243, 683 F.2d 154, 155 (6th Cir. 1982)) (“When a collective
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decisions essentially find that no-modification provisions can effectively
limit the arbitral power to fashion remedies, drawing from Supreme
Court guidance in the Steelworkers trilogy:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the col-
lective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. . . . [H]is award is legitimate only so long
as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
When the arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to this obligation,
courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.112
C. Challenging No-Modification Terms
In addition to defending arbitral awards against vacatur, claimants
may also directly challenge no-modification terms for lack of intent to
arbitrate—i.e., the parties could not have intended to submit their statu-
tory claim to an arbitrator who is without authority to resolve the claim
or remedy the injury.113 Under the FAA, “arbitration is simply a matter
of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes—
but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbi-
tration.”114 The parties must therefore consent to having particular
claims decided in the alternative forum—and no rational party would
willingly elect to have an equitable claim resolved in arbitration if the
claim cannot in fact be resolved in arbitration because of a no-modifica-
tion clause.115
bargaining agreement prohibits the addition of contract terms, the arbitrator may not proceed to
[add such terms].”); Local 1837, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Me. Pub. Serv. Co., 579 F. Supp.
744, 753 (D. Me. 1984) (“[I]t must be presumed that the parties . . . would not intend to empower
an arbitrator to disregard their collective bargaining agreement in fashioning a remedy for its
breach.”).
112. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
113. See, e.g., Transit Mix Concrete Corp. v. Local Union No. 282, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 809 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting AT&T
Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986)) (“[S]ince ‘arbitration is a matter of
contract . . . a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not
agreed so to submit.’”); Alcarez v. Avnet, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (D.N.M. 1996) (“If, by
terms of the Agreement, the arbitrator has no authority to award any [back-pay and other
statutory] damages under Title VII or the ADEA, then the parties did not intend to submit Title
VII or ADEA claims to arbitration.”).
114. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (emphasis added); see also
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (FAA § 2 demands that
arbitration agreements be enforced according to their terms).
115. Gorman, supra note 104, at 665 (stating that claim-resolution requires a decisionmaker
with the authority to issue injunctive remedies because “[b]road declarations of statutory rights are
meaningless absent effective remedies for the violation of those rights”). But see United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960) (“An order to
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.”).
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On this view, the only reasonable interpretation of a no-modifica-
tion clause is that the parties agreed that any claim seeking alteration of
contract terms would not be subject to resolution by arbitration. Rather,
only a court of law would be entrusted with claims seeking to reform or
alter underlying contract terms, which might carry substantial potential
to affect a defendant’s business practices. For example, in Paladino v.
Avnet Computer Technologies, the defendant argued that she was enti-
tled to have “any claim” sent to arbitration, including plaintiff’s Title
VII claim, notwithstanding a provision that the arbitrator shall have “no
authority” to award relief other than “damages for breach of con-
tract.”116 The Eleventh Circuit refused to enforce the no-modification
clause, finding that an arbitration agreement cannot force a party to arbi-
trate a statutory right and, at the same time, bar it from being awarded
full remedies in the arbitral forum.117
Other circuits have handled issues involving no-modification
clauses and remedy-restricting provisions in arbitration agreements dif-
ferently: for example, some courts require the arbitrator to decide in the
first instance whether remedial limitations are permissible,118 while
others sever the offending provisions and then compel arbitration.119
Still other courts have held that anti-reform provisions that forbid the
assertion of statutory rights constitute unenforceable waivers of liabil-
116. 134 F.3d 1054, 1056–57 (11th Cir. 1998).
117. Id. at 1062 (“This clause defeats the statute’s remedial purposes because it insulates
Avnet from Title VII damages and equitable relief.”).
118. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“Because the adequacy of arbitration remedies has nothing to do with whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate or if the claims are within the scope of that agreement, these challenges must first be
considered by the arbitrator.”); Bob Schultz Motors, Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 334 F.3d
721, 726 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he party seeking to void the provisions [in an arbitration agreement]
waiving punitive damages and other relief ha[s] to address those arguments to the arbitrator.”);
Larry’s United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2001) (declining to follow
Paladino, and stating that “[w]hether federal public policy prohibits an individual from waiving
certain statutory remedies is an issue that may be raised when challenging an arbitrator’s award”);
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Matrix Commc’ns Corp., 135 F.3d 27, 33 n.12 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
that an argument that an arbitration agreement is invalid because it forecloses certain remedies
otherwise available “must be brought to the arbitrator because it does not go to the arbitrability of
the claims but only to the nature of available relief”); Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d
222, 232 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The availability of punitive damages is not relevant to the nature of the
forum in which the complaint will be heard. Thus, availability of punitive damages cannot enter
into a decision to compel arbitration.”).
119. See, e.g., Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 734–35 (Ala. 2002) (severing provision in an
arbitration clause prohibiting punitive damages and then sending the case to arbitration); Ex parte
Celtic Life Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 766, 768–69 (Ala. 2002) (explaining that there is a “general ‘duty
of the court to preserve so much of a contract as may properly survive its invalid and ineffective
provisions,’” and enforcing the arbitration agreement minus the invalid provision excluding
punitive damages) (internal citations omitted).
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ity.120 For example, the Second Circuit recently held in Parisi v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co. that the anti-reform language in an arbitration
clause “insulating a [defendant] from damages and equitable relief ren-
ders the clause unenforceable.”121
Challenges to no-modification clauses based on lack of intent may
prove difficult in some cases, as claimants face a “substantial hurdle” in
seeking to rebut the presumption that all disputes not specifically
excluded are subject to arbitration.122 But, importantly, this challenge
does not implicate the cost-based concerns that were rejected by the
majority of the Supreme Court in Italian Colors: the argument here is
not that arbitration costs too much as compared to litigation, but rather,
that arbitration cannot provide equivalent (or any) remedies for viola-
tions of statutory rights.123 Whatever else the vindication of rights doc-
trine may entail, according to Justice Scalia’s opinion, it “would
certainly cover a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the
assertion of certain statutory rights.”124
IV. CONCLUSION
This essay has taken a first look at anti-reform provisions in arbitra-
tion clauses, which have emerged in two complementary forms: (1)
prohibitions against broad injunctive relief, and (2) limitations on arbi-
tral authority to modify the underlying contract. Working together, these
provisions block an individual arbitral claimant from ending a practice,
changing a rule, or enjoining an act that causes widespread injury.
The central question is whether anti-reform provisions are enforce-
able under current law—a critical issue with serious implications for
120. See supra note 86.
121. See Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 710 F.3d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Paladino,
134 F.3d at 1062); see also In re Managed Care Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1000–01 (S.D. Fla.
2000) (finding that prohibitions against damages in arbitration agreement prevents claimant “from
obtaining any meaningful relief for his statutory claims”).
122. Transit Mix Concrete Corp. v. Local Union No. 282, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 809 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1960)) (stating that absent an “‘express
provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration . . . only the most forceful evidence of
a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration’” will satisfy a party’s “substantial hurdle” to
rebut this “presumption of arbitrability”).
123. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (“[T]he antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable
procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”); id. at 2311 (“[T]he fact that it is not worth the
expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to
pursue that remedy.”).
124. Id.; see also In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2012)
(Jacobs, C.J., dissenting) (describing cases which “involved an arbitration agreement that entirely
foreclosed a remedy to which one of the parties was otherwise entitled to seek at law,” but which
did not invalidate arbitration “on the ground that the claims were costly to litigate individually”).
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statutory law enforcement and public policy. I have argued that provi-
sions which allow for only individualized injunctions and impose no-
modification language cannot be enforceable, as these clauses deny
claimants the right to vindicate their federal statutory rights in the arbi-
tral fora. But, in the wake of Concepcion and Italian Colors, one can
hardly be faulted for worrying that a majority of the Supreme Court
might find otherwise. And, in a world in which class action bans are per
se enforceable and every company now has the option to exempt itself
from class action liability, the significance of equitable claims is only
magnified, as these individually-sought remedies may be the only
remaining means of vindicating broadly-held statutory rights.
Courts are just beginning to hear arguments concerning the
enforceability of anti-reform clauses in arbitration agreements, and the
firepower that is being brought to bear by both sides reveals the signifi-
cant stakes.125 For corporate defendants, overcoming the legal chal-
lenges to anti-reform clauses may prove to be the final and decisive
battle in the long war over class actions.126 But, for claimants—consum-
ers, employees, small businesses, and society at large—the battle over
anti-reform provisions implicates the very foundations of the American
legal system. The inability to secure broad equitable relief as provided
by hundreds of federal statutes signals the demise of the private attorney
general concept, which underlies so much of the American statutory
enforcement regime. In this country, we assume “that private actors will
be the frontline enforcers in actions redressing broadscale securities
fraud, consumer fraud and deceptive trade practices, antitrust viola-
tions . . . , civil rights violations, and many other areas.”127 That assump-
tion depends entirely upon the ability of the private attorney general to
ferret out and enjoin widespread wrongdoing. Anti-reform provisions in
125. Note that a challenge to the Amex anti-reform provisions was lodged by the plaintiff class
in the wake of the Supreme Court decision in Italian Colors; the parties settled before the district
court ruled on the validity of the provisions. See Press Release, Am. Express, Am. Express Agrees
to Settle Class Action Litigs. (Dec. 19, 2013), available at http://about.americanexpress.com/
news/pr/2013/amex-agrees-to-settle-class-action.aspx (“American Express . . . said today that it
has agreed to settle two putative antitrust class actions filed by U.S. merchants that challenged the
company’s Card acceptance agreements. The settlement agreement will address certain merchant
concerns, while helping to ensure that American Express Card Members are treated fairly at the
point of sale. It will also limit the Company’s exposure to future legal claims.”).
126. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 391 (2005) (describing the war over class
actions, in which “entrenched corporate interests and equally entrenched plaintiffs’ lawyers and
interest groups have pursued competing legislative reform agendas, have pressed competing
doctrinal arguments in court and have offered competing policy justifications in the scholarly and
popular literature to support their positions”).
127. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 3, at 625–26; id. at 626 (“Private involvement in public
civil law enforcement is deeply embedded in our politics and culture.”).
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arbitration undermine that assumption, raising fundamental questions
concerning the suitability of arbitration for resolving issues that affect
broadly-held rights, and ultimately, whether the private attorney general
can effectively operate in these private, adjudicative arenas.
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